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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
SUBLET V. STATE: AUTHENTICATION OF EVIDENCE FROM
SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES REQUIRES A TRIAL
JUDGE TO FIND SUFFICIENT PROOF FROM WHICH A
REASONABLE JUROR COULD CONCLUDE THAT THE
EVIDENCE IS WHAT THE PROPONENT CLAIMS IT TO BE.
By: Denise A. Blake
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in three consolidated cases, held that a
trial judge must determine that evidence from a social networking website
meets the “reasonable juror” standard of authentication as a condition
precedent to admissibility. Sublet v. State, 442 Md. 632, 678, 113 A.3d 695,
722 (2015). This standard requires a preliminary determination by the trial
judge that a reasonable juror could find the evidence is what the proponent
claims it to be. Id.
In the first case, Albert Sublet IV (“Sublet”) allegedly assaulted Chrishell
Parker (“Parker”) and her family. At trial, Sublet sought to introduce into
evidence four pages of Parker’s Facebook posts about the incident. Parker
admitted the Facebook page was hers and that she had written some posts
about the incident, but denied writing the entries on the fourth page. The trial
judge sustained the State’s objection to the admission of the posts because it
was not clear whether Parker was responsible for all of the posts. The judge
held because Parker’s password was not secret, other people could have
accessed her Facebook page, and her denial had not been contradicted by
expert testimony.
In the second case, Tavares Harris (“Harris”) allegedly shot Jared C. and
Wasima Gary. At trial, the State attempted to introduce Harris’ direct
messages and tweets, which alluded to retaliation for an earlier incident
involving Jared C. The State planned to authenticate the social media
messages through expert testimony about the forensic examination of cell
phones. Over objection, the trial judge admitted the evidence after
determining the posts had been properly authenticated by the expert testimony
and independent witness verification of Harris’ Twitter account.
In the third case, Carlos Alberto Monge-Martinez (“Monge-Martinez”)
allegedly stabbed his former girlfriend. The State tried to introduce Facebook
messages allegedly sent by Monge-Martinez to prove he had intentionally
assaulted his former girlfriend. Over objection, the trial judge allowed the
victim to testify as to the distinct characteristics of the messages she received
and admitted the messages into evidence.
Sublet, Harris, and Monge-Martinez were convicted in their respective
circuit court and subsequently appealed. The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland affirmed the lower courts’ decisions in Sublet and Monge-Martinez.
Both defendants petitioned the Court of Appeals of Maryland for a writ of
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certiorari, which were granted. The court granted certiorari in Harris sua
sponte due to the similar subject matter, and consolidated all three cases.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland previously established a standard for
authenticating evidence from social networking websites in Griffin v. State.
Sublet, 442 Md. at 662, 113 A.3d at 712 (citing Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343,
346-47, 19 A.3d 415, 417 (2011)). Pursuant to Md. Rules of Evid. § 5901(b)(1) and (4), the court recommended three non-exclusive methods of
authenticating social media evidence. Sublet, 442 Md. at 663, 113 A.3d at
713. To confirm that the alleged author created the content in question, the
court will allow counsel to: (1) ask the alleged author to verify his or her social
networking profile and the post(s) in question; (2) examine the internet history
and hard drive of the alleged author’s computer to determine whether it
originated from that computer; and (3) use any additional information
provided by the social networking website that confirms the allegations. Id.
(internal citations omitted).
Due to the increased use of social media evidence, the court of appeals
decided to refine the Griffin authentication standard. Sublet, 442 Md. at 66364, 113 A.3d at 713-14. The court adopted the standard established by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v.
Vayner. Id. at 664, 113 A.3d at 714 (citing United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d
123 (2d Cir. 2014)). The Vayner standard requires the trial judge to make a
preliminary “context-specific determination whether . . . sufficient proof [has
been introduced from which] a reasonable juror could find . . . that the
evidence is what the proponent claims it to be.” Sublet, 442 at 666, 113 A.3d
at 715 (internal citations omitted). The proof may be direct or circumstantial
and does not have to be of a specific type or quantity. Id. at 667, 113 A.3d at
715. After the evidence is authenticated, opponents may challenge its
reliability, minimize its significance, or propose alternative explanations, just
as any other piece of evidence. Determining the reliability of the evidence is
left to the jury. Id. at 668-69, 113 A.3d at 717 (citing United States v.
Tropeano, 252 F.3d 653, 661 (2d Cir. 2001)).
Applying the Vayner standard, the court of appeals affirmed the
convictions in each consolidated case respectively. Sublet, 442 Md. at 671,
673, 676-77, 113 A.3d at 718-19, 721-22. In Sublet’s case, the court held that
the trial judge did not err in excluding the Facebook posts allegedly authored
by Parker because there was not sufficient proof of authenticity. Id. at 673,
113 A.3d at 719. Parker denied authoring the posts and no proof of distinct
characteristics was presented. Id. at 672-73, 113 A.3d at 718-19.
In Harris, the court of appeals held that the trial judge did not abuse her
discretion by admitting Twitter messages and tweets authored by Harris.
Sublet, 442 Md. at 675-76, 113 A.3d at 720-21. The Twitter username,
accompanying photographs, and message content were distinct characteristics
that constituted sufficient proof to allow a reasonable juror to possibly find the
messages and the tweets to be authentic. Id. In Monge-Martinez, the court of
appeals held that the trial judge did not err in admitting Facebook posts
authored by Monge-Martinez. Id. at 677, 113 A.3d at 722. The messages
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were sufficient proof of authentication because they were written soon after
the incident, in Spanish, and contained expressions of remorse. Id. at 677, 113
A.3d at 721.
In Sublet, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a trial judge must
determine that sufficient proof has been offered so that a reasonable juror may
find evidence from a social networking website to be authentic. The court
should provide more stringent guidelines as to the appropriate methods of
authenticating social media evidence. Without such, trial judges may apply
the standard inconsistently and with too much discretion, resulting in jurors
considering insufficiently authenticated evidence.

